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In recent years, research on experience-dependent plasticity has provided valuable insight
on adaptation to environmental input across the lifespan, and advances in understanding
the minute cellular changes underlying the brain’s capacity for self-reorganization have
opened exciting new possibilities for treating illness and injury. Ongoing work in this
line of inquiry has also come to deeply influence another field: cognitive neuroscience
of the normal aging. This complex process, once considered inevitable or beyond the
reach of treatment, has been transformed into an arena of intense investigation and
strategic intervention. However, important questions remain about this characterization
of the aging brain, and the assumptions it makes about the social, cultural, and
biological space occupied by cognition in the older individual and body. The following
paper will provide a critical examination of the move from basic experiments on
the neurophysiology of experience-dependent plasticity to the growing market for
(and public conception of) cognitive aging as a medicalized space for intervention
by neuroscience-backed technologies. Entangled with changing concepts of normality,
pathology, and self-preservation, we will argue that this new understanding, led by
personalized cognitive training strategies, is approaching a point where interdisciplinary
research is crucial to provide a holistic and nuanced understanding of the aging process.
This new outlook will allow us to move forward in a space where our knowledge, like our
new conception of the brain, is never static.
Keywords: plasticity, aging, cognitive training, computerized training, neurotechnology, cognitive decline,
normality, biocapital
A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAIN PLASTICITY
The human brain is the basis for many metaphors, qualifying
everything from how we succumb to reflex and addiction to
explaining how personality and selfhood is maintained over a
lifetime (Dumit, 2004; Wexler, 2006; Lock, 2013). Yet within
this anchoring framework, change is never-ceasing, encompassed
by the vast range of neurological modifications known collec-
tively as neuroplasticity. As a concept, the changeable brain is
an immensely fuzzy entity, and plasticity can include everything
from microscopic modifications of proteins at the synapse or
incorporation of new neurons, to large-scale overhaul of cortical
and subcortical areas in response to injury, illness or concerted
learning. Far from occurring only in adaptive or reparatory cir-
cumstances, plasticity is also entwined with numerous disease
processes, promoting cascades of maladaptive signaling patterns
or abnormal morphology. This homogenous collection of mod-
ifications has never been party to a sole method of study or
understanding in the neurosciences, and even today, scientists
who study plasticity have dramatically different ideas about its
range, role in day-to-day brain function and potential for use
(Kempermann, 2006; Wexler, 2006; Rees, 2010). However, most
can agree that it represents a challenging way to understand the
nervous system, and as such, is often incompletely interpreted in
descriptions of the brain and mind.
When the human brain is spoken of in terms of malleability,
experience-dependent plasticity, or the capacity of the brain to
alter itself in response to environmental input, is most often
implicated. The fundamental morphological changes of this pro-
cess, first hypothesized by early neuroscientists such as Cajal at the
synaptic level (DeFelipe, 2006), are today understood to occur at
most levels of organization in the nervous system. Plasticity is a
fundamental part of the brain’s complexity, allowing it to adapt
to subtle environmental changes on the timescale of milliseconds,
and maintain the most useful of these modifications for a lifetime.
Yet far from a universal process, plasticity of this type was thought
to be segregated into distinct periods within an individual’s life.
From experiments in the 1960s onward, the vast majority of the
brain’s capacity for flexibility was understood to occur early in
the lifecourse, preparing an organism for salient environmental
cues, and “locking in” the necessary skills and behaviors to assure
continued survival and thriving. Large-scale changes and learning
were limited to discrete “critical periods”, after which the brain
could not be significantly altered. This version of the moldable,
adaptable brain has been adopted in a number of fields, most
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notably, developmental neurolinguistics (cf. Penfield and Roberts,
1959; Lenneberg, 1967; Wexler, 2006).
However, a broader, more nuanced version of this framework
has recently begun to creep into public discourse, elaborating on
the possibilities for large-scale change outside of embryogenesis
or childhood. No-one believes that adults cannot learn, but it is
fairly universally acknowledged that the process is slower, more
laborious, and perhaps ultimately less efficient than is the case
for younger brains. Only in truly exceptional experiences, such as
after large-scale damage to the brain, can individuals seemingly
break through boundaries encoded since childhood to make
significant changes in brain wiring and patterns of connectivity.
Just such exceptional circumstances provided early experimental
frameworks for exploring the boundaries of plasticity in adult-
hood. In the mid-1970s, it was shown that using adult non-
human primates and dramatic cessation of peripheral input (in
perhaps the most notable instance, via finger amputation) could
change allocation of space on the brain’s somatosensory cortex
(Kaas et al., 1983; Merzenich et al., 1984). Though experimental
manipulations were fairly crude by today’s standards, the amount
of change elicited in the brain was truly remarkable, exceeding
expectations, and resulting in complex changes at a cortical,
subcortical, and even midbrain-level (Wall et al., 2002).
Despite the exciting findings of this early work, adult neu-
roplasticity had to gain a more tangible footing in everyday
experience to attain the widespread recognition and seriousness
previously accorded to well-known facts in neuroscientific dis-
course (Hacking, 1995, 1999; Young, 1995). This recognition
arrived with three major advances in the 1990s. First, a landmark
series of studies in birds, rodents and higher mammals solidified
the concept of neural genesis in the adult brain, widening conver-
sations and debates about learning and adaptability beyond tradi-
tional critical periods (Ming and Song, 2005; Rubin, 2009; Rees,
2010). Secondly, through continuing work with primates, the
notion of experience-dependent plasticity could be quantified on
much more subtle (and less dangerous) terms, showing that as a
result of learning, the brain could be modified (Rencanzone et al.,
1993; Xerri et al., 1998). Building on these studies, improved neu-
roimaging technology further allowed neuroscientists to look for
evidence of structural experienced-based changes in the human
brain. Through work with diverse experimental paradigms, they
found them, exceeding the wildest expectations of the scientific
community only a decade before. Employment, musical training,
and even studying for exams appeared to be sufficient to promote
large-scale structural changes in the brain outside of childhood
(Maguire et al., 2000; Gaser and Schlaug, 2005; Draganski et al.,
2006; Draganski and May, 2008). No longer could the adult brain
be considered a fixed entity, immune to the mundane activities of
day-to-day life, and impervious to new learning or restructuring.
This level of malleability challenges neurobiologists struggling
to pin down its biochemical substrates as well as decades of dis-
course and knowledge about the relationship between an individ-
ual, the brain, the mind and the environment (Malabou, 2008).
However, nowhere do these ideas about change and flexibility
have more potential to overhaul common understanding and
dialogue than in the study of the aging process (Baltes et al., 2006;
Katz and Peters, 2008; Williams et al., 2012). Older adults have
long occupied a strange zone of tension and liminality, exemplify-
ing the view of adult-brain-as-fixed-entity, and straddling the line
between retention of past experiences and loss of “self ” through
pathology (Baltes and Smith, 2003; Corner and Bond, 2004).
Challenging decades of crystallized knowledge about a static or
deteriorating brain is a complicated enterprise, yet the notion of a
flexible older brain is moving into the public mind with remark-
able swiftness, borne further along with every advance in the
neuroscience of adult plasticity (Katz and Peters, 2008; Malabou,
2008; Rees, 2010). What has enabled this evolution, and how has
neuroscience been transformed into a discussion of lifestyle, new
self-defined aging and re-definition of its boundaries? To answer
these questions, the many understandings of aging today need
to be disentangled, tracing back the current state of affairs to a
complex negotiation and renegotiation of the aging mind and
brain in biomedical discourse.
NEUROSCIENTIFIC ENCOUNTERS WITH AGING
Of course, it cannot be said that the aging brain was always an
object of concerted inquiry. Like many other fields, it has been
deeply influenced by interplay of scientific and cultural forces
during its development (cf. Hacking, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999).
Since the earliest treatises on the human body, individuals have
recognized that advancing age engenders numerous changes in
thought and action, leading to a gradual slowing of cognitive
functions and adaptability to the environment. Earlyt scholars
ascribed these changes to complex environmental interactions
and processes, and it was not until the late 19th century that
technological advances in microscopy and formalized neurology
allowed doctors such as Charcot to make more firm divisions
between what was pathological, and what was expected as a
part of more “normal” decline (Achenbaum, 1974; Katz, 1996,
2006). The psychological tradition was somewhat slower to begin
describing the aging mind in its own right, but nonetheless early
authors often had a few words to say on the topic. During this
time, most literature on the topic described a sort of “rigidity”
accompanying the aging process in the mind and brain, and even
went so far as to describe the aging mind with “the cognitive
grooves and channels set, the power of assimilation gone” (James,
1893). Even early gerontological literature such as G. Stanley
Hall’s Senescence qualified older individuals as “battered, water-
logged leaking derelicts”, and emphasized decay of mental facul-
ties and adaptability (Hall, 1922; Cole, 1984). The aging mind,
unfortunately, was also excluded from much early psychoanalytic
study. In the words of Sigmund Freud (1905) “Near and above the
fifties, the elasticity of the mental processes on which [psychoan-
alytic therapy] depends, is, as a rule, lacking- old people are no
longer educable. . .”. This (admittedly somewhat dismal) outlook
shaped the concept of aging as of one of passive, inevitable decline,
where if one was lucky enough to avoid pathological changes,
slow, progressive decline of mental flexibility and adaptability
could be expected with time.
Happily, today this type of thinking has seen an about-face,
and aging is seen in a far less “restrictive” manner. This change has
been enabled by numerous factors, most centrally, a move to study
aging individuals and their brains in the absence of pathology.
In turn, this line of thought has severely undermined the belief
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that the aging brain is set in stone, and grounded entire lines
of inquiry in examining late-life change and adaptability. While
in large part, development of improved experimental paradigms
and neuroimaging techniques may account for this latter interest,
the changeable, environmentally-sensitive brain may in fact be
located much earlier, coinciding with more sophisticated under-
standings of life in old age brought about by a rising interest in
social welfare early in the 20th century (Hirshbein, 2000; Pickard,
2011).
With modernizing societies in Europe and North America
at this time, formalized gerontology emerged in the 1910s and
20s with a view of defining more rigorous standards for shaping
normality in aging and partitioning which groups of seniors
should be party to health interventions (cf. Lorge, 1948; Sheldon,
1948; Pickard, 2011). Wide epidemiological surveys (cf. Terman,
1916; Jones and Conrad, 1933) and the beginning of development
of formalized cognitive testing such as the Wechsler–Bellevue
Adult Intelligence scales (Wechsler, 1939) further reinforced ideas
about defining intelligence and other cognitive processes across
the lifecourse (Schaie, 2005). Partly due to this new body of
quantifiable knowledge, several investigators also began examin-
ing how environmental factors such as low socioeconomic status
or lack of community/familial involvement could be correlated
with poor cognitive or physical outcomes for seniors (Kuhlen,
1940; Sheldon, 1948; Townsend, 1957). In one sense, studying
the deleterious effects of these factors could be seen to provide
a strong grounding for experience-dependent plasticity in old
age. However, apart from a newfound respect for environmental
factors affecting individuals’ well-being later in life, and general
programs aiming to improve (usually financial) wellbeing of
seniors such as Social Security in the United States, cognitive
decline was not tackled in a preventative, or changeable nature
(Katz, 1996, 2006; Hendricks and Achenbaum, 1999).
The first interventions aimed at making permanent physical
changes to the aging brain grew from studies of stroke reha-
bilitation in the early 20th century (cf. Warren, 1950; Blaikie,
1999; Carr and Shepherd, 2006). Drawing heavily on beliefs about
reflexology and operant conditioning, investigators explored how
discrete, repetitive activities could be used “to restore motor abil-
ity, insofar as is possible, within the irreversible limitations set by
injury or disease, and the process of aging” (Voss, 1967, emphasis
in original). Early rehabilitation for brain-based trauma had mod-
est success, yet in many ways surpassed progress in understanding
more subtle forms of age-related changes in cognition at that time.
Despite technological advances permitting better understanding
of pathological processes, the search for effective treatment or
streamlined in vivo diagnostic markers for age-related cognitive
decline remained fruitless. However, somewhat later, the first early
studies in purely cognitive rehabilitation began to be performed
(cf. Hoyer et al., 1973; Baltes and Baltes, 1977; Poon et al.,
1980). Most investigators reported some measure of success in
improving efficiency of cognitive processes, but their results failed
to gain public notoriety. Today, it is difficult to explain why such
promising findings that had potential to dramatically shift ideas
about change in aging remained relegated to discrete circles of
neuroscientific inquiry. One possibility is that their rubric of
success, improved performance on neurocognitive tests, did not
immediately suggest applicability to everyday problems faced by
aging individuals with declining cognitive function. Another is
that the investigations were just too early: unlike the widespread
excitement about plasticity in younger adults brought about by
advances in the 1990s, as well as a lack of visible changes made
possible by later technological developments, cognitive training
(CT) stayed quietly as an area of interest pursued by a small body
of investigators in careful, but limited studies (Willis, 1990).
However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, advances in
in vivo imaging technology provided the impetus for the cognitive
neuroscience of aging to gather momentum through a series of
landmark studies. Not surprisingly, this time frame also coincided
with a growing interest in the disease burden caused by the aging
baby boom generation, which called governments worldwide to
gain new understanding of citizens who would soon be using
health care resources (particularly for conditions such as demen-
tia) at an unprecedented rate (Brookmeyer et al., 2007; Moreira,
2009a). For the first time, aging adults defined as within “normal”
ranges of function for their age cohort were subject to imaging
as an object of inquiry, providing a more sensitive window to
structural and metabolic correlates of slowing cognition in later
life. This development coincided with the development of higher-
resolution in imaging techniques, which was able to present
several candidates for nuanced structural correlates of aging,
primarily seen in evidence for changes in white- and gray-matter
density over the lifecourse. (Raz et al., 2005; Batouli et al., 2014).
Furthermore, it appeared that changes in volume in certain areas
such as the frontal or dorso-lateral—prefrontal cortex, known
to be implicated in a variety of high-level cognitive functions
(Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Miller, 1999), could be correlated with
poor performance on a variety of cognitive tasks (Raz et al.,
1999; Rypma and D’Esposito, 2000; Bartzokis et al., 2001). Other
intriguing findings came from studies of functional neuroimag-
ing, where investigators first remarked that aged brains demon-
strated dramatically different patterns of activation in response to
cognitive testing than younger brains. Not only did it appear that
blood-oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) activity was more
diffuse in the aged brain, but also that tasks normally lateralized to
a single hemisphere spread to the other (Spreng et al., 2010; Eyler
et al., 2011). The exact reasons for these changes is still debated
(cf. Reuter-Lorenz and Park, 2010; Grady, 2012), but without a
doubt, they have changed the types on conversation had about
cognitive aging. No longer could declines in cognitive function
be ascribed solely to decay/neurodegeneration, but instead are
spoken about in terms such as “adaptation”, “compensation”, and
“re-allocation”(Hazlett et al., 1998; Reuter-Lorenz and Cappell,
2008; Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009), framing the aging brain
as having agency in a changing environment. Indeed, instead
of gradually shutting down in the face of advancing years, the
aging brain appeared to demonstrate impressive reorganization
and plastic adaptation in its own right.
These developments in and of themselves modified conversa-
tions about the aging brain, but it would take one more wave
of advances to catapult neuroplasticity into the realm of acces-
sibility and malleability as discussed today. If the normally aging
brain was modifiable to the extent that cognitive slowing could
be correlated with discrete structural or “adaptive” metabolic
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changes, then could a mobilization of plasticity-inducing exper-
imental paradigms be used to attenuate or reverse these changes?
In younger brains, the evidence pointed toward yes, showing
impressive experience/training-based reorganization (Draganski
and May, 2008; Scholz et al., 2009; Kanai and Rees, 2011). Investi-
gators such as Bäckman and May began to more closely examine
training-based changes in cognition in the elderly using structural
and functional imaging methods. The results were unexpectedly
good, demonstrating that anywhere from several hours to 3
months of training on a given task could produce patterns of
activation more similar to that seen in a younger person (Nyberg
et al., 2003; Erikson et al., 2007), generalize to other domains
(Berry et al., 2010), and even produce large structural changes
in gray matter density and connectivity (Boyke et al., 2008).
While still confined to a laboratory environment, it appeared that
changes in age-related substrates could be effectively targeted,
laying the framework for a new way of interacting with and
modifying the aging brain.
CONCEPTUALIZING COGNITIVE TRAINING
Recognizing the potential of such findings to be implemented in
a constructive fashion with aging populations worldwide, teams
of scientists, investors and software developers began working
together in the early 2000s to create sophisticated training pro-
grams that could be delivered to consumers in an electronic
format. What, exactly, are these programs? Electronic CT is an
immensely diverse field, but the basic premise of all programs
relies on using specially-designed training to shape neural con-
nectivity and efficiency underlying cognitive processes such as
attention or working memory. Distinct from free online “brain
training games” such as Sudoku, these programs rely on personal-
ized measures of cognitive acuity such as reaction time, and tailor
difficulty and duration of tasks to the user. While some more
elaborate setups may include neural feedback devices, the most
popular products on the market consist of a series of games based
on (perhaps somewhat drier) validated training techniques from
lab-based CT human. One of the most remarkable aspects of these
programs is the diversity of their clientele. While some companies
offer a general purpose program that allow “anyone to achieve
their full potential” (Lumosity, 2013, “About Lumosity”), other
more recent products have specifically developed platforms for
individuals with everything from attention deficit hyperactive dis-
order (Pearson, 2014, “ADHD and Beyond”; PRweb, 2013, “Cog-
niFit launches a specific brain training for ADHD”) to traumatic
brain injuries (Eschen, 2012, “Brain Injury Survivor”). Although
programs may be geared toward individuals with neuropathology,
they are not formally recognized by any national diagnostic or
prescriptive body as a formal sources of medical treatment. Aside
from “retraining the brain” in the presence of a host of medical
conditions, many sites emphasize how their products benefit
healthy users too. Several sites contain extensive testimonials from
individuals who have used their product to excel at work, school,
and day-to-day tasks such as driving (cf. Posit Science, 2014,
“Proven in lives”; Pearson, 2014, “User stories”; Vivity Labs, 2014,
“What our users are saying”).
However, as this paper specifically examines CT’s relationship
with aging, several criteria were used to identify companies that
work specifically in this area. First, candidate CT companies were
tracked-down using trade publications to identify companies with
the largest customer base and revenue flow that sell training soft-
ware to the public. Subsequently, these companies’ online litera-
ture was reviewed, and only groups who specifically mention their
product targeting older adults. By this rubric, Lumosity (Lumos
Labs), Brain HQ (Posit Neuroscience), Cogmed (Pearson), Cog-
niFit (CogniFit), HappyNeuron (HAPPYneuron), Dakim Brain
Fitness (Dakim), Fit Brains (Vivity Labs), and NeuroActive (Brain
Center International) were all selected. From there, all product-
associated information available on the internet, including adver-
tisement, scientific claims and associated blogs were analyzed
for information grouped into 4 clusters: (1) Neuroplasticity and
its role in CT programming; (2) Definition of normal cognitive
aging; (3) Explanation of age-related cognitive impairment and
other pathology; and (4) Sociocultural factors involved in shaping
brain health. The first cluster on CT mechanics will be explored
in the following paragraphs, while subsequent themes correspond
to later sections of this paper. Coverage of these issues naturally
varied by site, but every effort has been made in this paper to
provide themes common to several. This strategy, while providing
a basic overview, does not represent a formal textual analysis and
has several limitations which are discussed near the end of this
paper.
While each of the CT programs evaluated differs slightly
in layout and approach, all programs describe the science of
experience-dependent plasticity as the foundation of their prod-
uct. As one group explains, plasticity “the physical changes that
are continually taking place in your brain as you experience
and adapt to the world around you” (Lumosity, 2014, “How
cognitive training works”). Other sites invoke similar metaphors,
using new connectivity and neurogenesis to create an image of
a strong brain, resistant to the onslaught of injury or pathology
(cf. HAPPYneuron., 2013, “Efficiency of brain training”; Pearson,
2013, “Cogmed is based on a research breakthrough”; Pearson,
2013, “Brain fitness and brain training”). While the language is
simplified, the basic idea holds relatively true to the neuroscience
of plasticity. Using more recent findings, the consumer is further
assured that this processes continues well into adult life. Here, the
language becomes very empowerment-heavy, stressing how adult
neuroplasticity has made a fundamental change in the way aging is
perceived. “There really is no critical period of brain development
unless one considers life itself to be the measure” claims one
group, rather dubiously (Pearson, 2013, “Brain fitness and brain
training”), while another states “brain plasticity is driving a rev-
olution in brain health and science” (Posit Science, 2013, “Brain
plasticity exercises”). In case there was any doubt in the mind of
prospective consumers, it is also made very clear that these ideas
extend to older individuals as well. Whether a company speaks
of “empowering seniors” (Dakim, Inc, 2013, “The science behind
Dakim Brain Fitness”) or “mak[ing] improvements at any age”
(Pearson, 2013, “Brain fitness and brain training”), a clear link
is made to using neuroplasticity-based training and shaping a
healthier brain in later life.
All together, these groups are united by claims of “retrain-
ing” the aging brain by exploiting neuroplasiticty, with a view
of preserving cognitive function into later life (cf. Dakim, Inc,
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2013, “The science behind Dakim Brain Fitness”; Lumosity, 2013,
“About Lumosity”; Posit Science, 2013, “Why should you use
BrainHQ?”). Training strategies themselves differ from site to
site, but many target cognitive functions with a variety of games
exercising functions such as working memory, auditory precision,
and processing speed. Many of the larger companies also devote
a significant portion of their web space to showcasing studies
that demonstrate the effectiveness of their product, for example,
improving working memory, or generalizing to other activities
(cf. Lumosity, 2013, “Completed research behind Lumosity”;
Pearson, 2013, “Peer-reviewed research”). One could be forgiven,
based on this evidence, for thinking that the ability to “retrain” the
aging brain was already achieved, but in fact, most CT enterprises
are involved with multiple ongoing studies examining further
applications, generalizability, or other aspects of their products.
Much of this research is done in conjunction with investigators
at universities, or other institutions, such as pharmaceutical com-
panies or retirement homes, that permit access to large groups
of study participants and further validation of results (Lumosity,
2013, “Get involved overview”; Posit Science, 2013, “Partners”;
Sharpbrains, 2013). While many groups are diversifying to new
clinical populations via ongoing clinical trials, older users are
major clientele of this software, and are aggressively marketed-to
both in online literature, and other publications aimed at an older
audience (Friedman et al., 2011; Millington, 2011; Vandenberg
et al., 2012).
With this approach of neuroscience-backed marketing and
strategic partnerships, corporate brain training initiatives’
involvement with the aging brain has been wildly successful, and
continues to grow, several neurotechnology consulting groups,
who have been monitoring CT’s development with great interest
have recently posited that revenues are expected to climb to 6
billion dollars in the next decade, following a trend of exponential
growth in coming years (Litinsky and Avila, 2009; Sharpbrains,
2012, “Executive summary”). This is remarkably good business
for training companies, and other industries have taken note of
both these profits and success stories from the field. Notably,
exclusive alliances have been formed with several insurance com-
panies such as Penn Treaty and Humanacare, and promoted as
a way for policyholders to “actively address their concerns of
developing dementia” (Brown, 2006; Posit Science, 2013, “Penn
treaty first to offer brain fitness program”). Insurance companies
are an important source of reification of medical knowledge, and
have historically played an instrumental role in development of
new medical categories (Brown, 1995; Rosenberg, 2002), and they
are not the only way in which CT companies have expanded.
Despite the fact that CT strategies are not recognized as a formal
medical intervention for cognitive changes in later life, the phar-
maceutical company Bayer has recently partnered with CT group
CogniFit, hoping to develop training-based treatment for several
neurological conditions (Bayer de Mexico, 2013). Additionally,
CT centers are popping up in a variety of settings serving older
adults, from hospitals (Baycrest, 2013) and more than 400 long-
term care facilities in the US, Canada, and Europe (Fernandez,
2008; Litinsky and Avila, 2009), and being marketed directly to
healthcare professionals to enrich their clients’ lives (Dakim, Inc,
2013, “Dakim BrainFitness software, professional”; Pearson, 2013,
“Healthcare professionals”). Finally, interest in CT appears to
have overflowed from purely biomedical frames of discussion to
popular media (Friedman et al., 2011; Vandenberg et al., 2012),
evidenced by a slew of recent publication in lay journals such
as The Economist, New Yorker and The Wall Street Journal,
exploring the new reach of CT technologies in the “new aging
brain” (cf. Marx, 2013; The Economist, 2013; Reddy, 2013).
BIOCAPITAL AND BIO-QUANDARIES: DEFINITION OF
NORMAL AGING
At the heart of this hype and excitement lies what Franklin (2003);
Sunder Rajan (2003, 2006) and others have termed “biocapital”.
This way of understanding emerging technologies, the latter
author writes, represents the fusion of biomedical innovation
with profit-driven enterprise, and may thus be studied through
the making and marketing of biological entities. (Sunder Rajan,
2003, 2006; Birch and Tyfield, 2013). Furthermore, biological
material may itself become a player in networks of Foucauldian
political and economic power, and alter individual subjectivities
of participants in said networks (Foucault, 1978; Rose, 2007;
Helmreich, 2008). While originally studied through ethnography
in relation to physical biological matter such as DNA samples
(Sunder Rajan, 2003), the rise of neuroscience-backed technolo-
gies has given rise to new blends of biocapital focused on the
human mind and brain. Notably, Nikolas Rose and others have
extensively written about this expansion, particularly with respect
to neuropharmaceuticals and the way that they shape norms,
ideas, and framing of human identity (Rose and Novas, 2003;
Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). While the biovalue created by CT
in the form of a brain that is “sharp, healthy and young” (Brain
Center International, 2014, “The ultimate brain fitness program”)
is perhaps more abstract than a blood test or a gene chip, its
development still parallels that of earlier medical technologies
within biocapital. Further, the type of identity created within this
process carries with it many of the risks and ethical quandaries
found in previous profit-driven approaches entangled with the
human mind and brain (Rose and Novas, 2003; Davies, 2010;
Pitts-Taylor, 2010).
How then, may we study the rise of CT through with the
tools of biocapital, and best conceptualize its interactions with
the neuroscience of the aging brain? To this end, we begin by
making a close investigation of the scientific claims underlying
CT’s promises, and how they shape a new vision of aging. Despite
their formidable successes in recent years, the approach of refin-
ing the aging brain through training has come under intense
scrutiny. Naturally, a major source of debate has been whether
CT programs, whether for young or old, live up to their scientific
claims. In the realm of cognitive malleability in the aging brain,
several meta-analyses and reviews have found evidence to suggest
that training programs, indeed, prove an effective and promising
avenue of intervention in older adults (Eschen, 2012; Kueider
et al., 2012; Reijnders et al., 2013). On the other hand, several
other works have found insufficient evidence to CT’s claims to
effectiveness (Papp et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2011) or transfer to
other domains (Noack et al., 2009; Buitenweg et al., 2012). Even
with strong methodology and results, rubrics for defining success
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and persistence of effects differ significantly, which, coupled with
assurance of ethical conduct makes large-scale validation and
follow-ups difficult (Rabipour and Raz, 2012; Jak et al., 2013). It is
beyond the scope of this paper to make definitive critiques about
the efficacy of the vast diversity of products and approaches on the
market (which are followed in more detail from the above-cited
articles and meta-analyses), except to say that this high level of
scientific scrutiny appears to continue unabated. With increasing
tendencies toward biomedical validation, however, it is likely that
most companies will continue to engage in this kind of dialogue.
Ideally, ongoing studies and further affirmation will foster public
interest in more research, new and different paradigms, and
extension of ongoing clinical trials in new populations.
Yet, there are still a number of crucial questions to be examined
about the entanglement of CT programs’ framing of aging and
plasticity in ongoing programs. Quite apart from debates on
the nature of late-life plasticity, the process of growing older is
hardly a unitary concept or scientific fact. If neuroscience can
be mobilized by training to remedy the aging process, which
methodological and theoretical assumptions are propagated and
emphasized in its vision of the process of growing older? At its
simplest, CT is touted as a new way to slow changes associated
with normal aging, and return healthy older adults to a level
of function more comparable to “younger” brains. This idea
is deceptively simple, and already implicates a wide variety of
social, cultural and neuroscientific norms in creating “a rejuve-
nated brain that acts like 10 or more years ago” (Brain Center
International, 2013, “Balance your brain”). Viewed even at the
most basic neurobiological level, the changes in the aging brain
that CT presumably remedies or reverses are extremely difficult
to define, no less measure (Belleville and Bherer, 2012; Thomas
and Baker, 2012). Research on neurological correlates of non-
pathological aging is not a large field, but in recent years, evidence
seems to be converging on a number of factors that change with
advancing years in the brain. Structural changes to gray- and
white matter occur, as well as a shift to more diffuse patterns
of BOLD activation, and reductions in several populations of
neurotransmitters have all been consistently observed (Raz and
Rodrigue, 2006; Grady, 2008; Juraska and Lowry, 2012). These
factors form the basis for current theories of plasticity in aging
(Cabeza et al., 2004; Greenwood, 2007; Grady, 2012). Critically,
due to the diversity of disciplines involved in the study of these
factors, it unclear what relationship, if any, these findings possess
to one-another, and a unified neurological vision of aging is
far from complete. Further, it is not yet known whether these
changes signal a fundamental underlying process, the net effect
of environmental stressors on cellular health, or plastic changes to
adapt to other forms of bodily degeneration (i.e., peripheral loss
of hearing or vision capability).
It may be argued that as long as CT makes a tangible, pos-
itive difference in the lives of its trainees, this level of reduc-
tionism and exactitude in means of action is not necessary.
Indeed, in extant product literature, the biological correlates of
slowing cognition in normal aging are not discussed, save for
general statements about the brain using much slower processing
speed in day-to-day situations (cf. Sternberg, 2012; Posit Science,
2013, “Memory Lapses”), or how increased stimulation-based
connectivity appears to be protective (HAPPYneuron., 2013,
“Efficiency of brain training”; Pearson, 2013, “Brain fitness and
brain training”). However, as CT operations move toward increas-
ing medical validation and prescriptive use of their paradigms (as
evidenced by increasing cooperation with insurance companies,
the pharmaceutical industry and healthcare providers), defining
more concrete routes of action will be critical, and must hold
together with consistent data about qualifying the “ideal” trainee.
If a given product or program is advertised to work on the “nor-
mally aging brain”, then substantial neurobiological delimiting
factors will need to be elaborated-on, and form a basis for a
better understanding of what does- and does not- accompany this
heterogeneous collection of neurobiological processes.
In the absence of this knowledge, operationalizing “normalcy”
in aging at a clinical/population level via more indirect measures
presents a number of large challenges that are also absent from
CT product interpretations of aging. Today, the clinical version of
healthy cognitive function is mainly determined by test batteries,
with “healthy” aging defined as better-than-cutoff performance
on a series of testing criteria including The Mini-Mental State
Exam, Abbreviated Mental Test or Mini-Cog, with more conclu-
sive pathological diagnosis and monitoring made possible via in-
depth neuropsychological test batteries and assessment of impair-
ment in daily life (Woodford and George, 2007; Depp et al., 2012;
Galvin and Sadowsky, 2012). These tools have helped researcher
and clinicians to converge on a number of functions that typically
deteriorate with age, most prominently difficulties with working
memory, attention, and visuospatial accuracy (Cabeza et al., 2004;
Reuter-Lorenz and Park, 2010; Grady, 2012). However, it has
also been well-documented that aging populations demonstrate
remarkable intra-group variance, which makes creating appli-
cable “points of reference” for good cognition challenging. At
one end of the spectrum are the “super normals”—individuals
who outperform age-matched (and sometimes even younger)
controls on most tests of cognitive function, and at the other,
individuals who have been severely affected by cognitive decline
at a relatively young age (Ylikoski et al., 1999; Ardila, 2007). Some
investigators have even found evidence to suggest that cognitive
decline begins in the early 30s, further complicating “boundary”
conditions for defining change across the lifecourse (Salthouse,
2009a,b). Therefore, this category formation, a process already
fraught with complex social influences and meaning (Young,
1995; Hacking, 2007; Slaby and Choudhury, 2012), is complicated
by wide biological variance.
ILLNESS, HEALTH, AND INDETERMINACY: EXPLANATION OF
AGE-RELATED COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT AND OTHER
PATHOLOGY
Thus, while historical definitions of aging in Europe and North
America relied on a clear dichotomy between externalized pathol-
ogy and lack thereof (Katz, 1996, 2006; Jones and Higgs, 2010),
today a scientific consensus is not so clear. Yet this perspective
still appears to be employed in CT explanations of what one
should expect in aging. What about other perspectives in this
problem in the lived experiences of older adults, and rooted in
traditions in the humanities and social sciences? To this end, our
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understandings of normal aging (and study thereof in CT) owes
a significant debt to a number of authors writing in science and
technology studies and anthropology of medicine. Notably, work
by Margaret Lock has explored how tacit culturally-informed
meanings interact with scientific discourse framing aging and
biological changes (Lock, 1993, 2013). This spirit, guided by other
important works by authors such as Lawrence Cohen on cultural
politics of senility have helped shape a space for an anthropology
of “normal aging” as a phenomenon irretrievably culture-bound,
and framed by narrative, expectation, and behavior (Cohen, 1994,
2000). Sociological inquiry, too, draws from this model, but also
emphasizes a whole-lifecourse perspective, where normality in
aging is shaped by institutions and inequalities (Dannefer, 2011).
As such, “normal aging” is a cultural construct deeply instilled
with social values of autonomy and productivity (Jones and
Higgs, 2010; Pickard, 2011). Drawing from work in both of these
academic traditions, the next section of this paper will examine
how CT engages with these differing definitions of aging, and
employs neuroplasticity therein. Further, these processes will be
examined in the light of diagnostic complications.
The most common understanding of the definition of “normal
aging” in public discourse, and the one seemingly favored by
CT enterprises, hearkens most back to a historical binary state,
delineated by boundaries of recognized neuropathology. In this
sense, one becomes “old” at a somewhat arbitrary age late in
working life, but remains normal until signs of disease processes
are evident in day-to-day actions. Heterogeneous age-associated
changes, therefore, are largely framed in most forms of public
discourse (including these sites), in terms of deterioration lead-
ing ultimately to pathology (cf. Cognifit, 2013, “Alzheimer’s”;
HAPPYneuron., 2013, “Cognitive decline and brain training”;
Posit Science, 2013, “Memory lapses”). Partially through the work
of lobby groups and increasing public awareness, fears about
progression to this type of unhealthy aging is most instinctively
associated with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and related dementias
(Moreira, 2009b; Lock, 2013). In recent years, sobering reports on
the prevalence and economic burden of AD have been widely pub-
lished, including several by Alzheimer’s Disease International, The
European Union and other international policy groups, illustrat-
ing and emphasizing the grave and immediate need for education
and treatment (Council of the European Union, 2008; Alzheimer’s
Disease International, 2009). Rising public consciousness about
AD has also certainly played in role in the shaping of CT literature
targeting older clients. Here, “healthy” cognitive functioning is
generally defined as being a factor in daily annoyances, while the
terrors of dementia or other diseases are equated to a loss of men-
tal control and selfhood. These fears are strongly broadcast, occu-
pying a central position in product promotion (cf. Dakim, Inc,
2013, “Give a loved one the mental stimulation they need”; Mind
Evolve, 2013, “Improve memory and brain health”; Vandenberg
et al., 2012). By promoting dementia-related anxieties, most
companies frame age-related cognitive changes as a precursor to
or emerging symptom of cognitive dementia, making statements
such as “It is proven that cognitive abilities decline with time if
nothing is done to prevent it” (Cognifit, 2013, “Mind Exercises”).
In this light, elucidating whether training can prevent small
cognitive changes from progressing into pathological processes
is a major topic of research still being explored. Some studies
have shown modest improvements and delaying of symptoms
for individuals with AD or MCI (Belleville, 2008; Valenzuela and
Sachdev, 2009; Herrera et al., 2012), but others have failed to find
an effect (Jean et al., 2010; Unverzagt et al., 2012). Nonetheless,
training is touted as playing an instrumental role in halting disease
progression on several sites (Dakim, Inc, 2013, “The science
behind Dakim Brain Fitness”; Brain Center International, 2013,
“Balance your brain”), further helping to reinforce ideas about
normality and pathology-related deviation.
How, then, could CT use these expectations to actively
define a space for prescriptive action in the aging brain? Even
guiding a seemingly clear dichotomy between to-be-expected
decline and pathology is party to historical and contemporary
debates surrounding category boundaries in old age (Gaines
and Whitehouse, 2006; Whitehouse and George, 2011; Williams
et al., 2012). Despite researchers’ best efforts, reliable diagnostic
markers for AD and other dementias have proved elusive, and
broadening pre-existing disease categories to include wider diag-
nostic criteria and extend the reach of treatment has proved highly
contentious. A relevant example comes from the recent develop-
ment of a disease category for Mild Cognitive Impairment, non-
specific cognitive changes usually linked to progression of other
conditions like AD (Golomb et al., 2004; Gauthier et al., 2006).
This move has caused controversy both within and outside of the
medical community (Graham and Ritchie, 2006; Whitehouse and
Moody, 2006), and heightened awareness of the complexities and
seriousness of cognitive decline at all stages in older adults. For
brain training companies, drawing from current public discourse
on dementia is a way to help consumers appreciate the gravity
of maintaining and understanding cognitive health across the
lifecourse, and perhaps take “protective” steps that they might not
otherwise be aware of. Even if, as one group writes, “because of
your brains (sic) special plastic powers, you have a much better
chance of recovering [from] disease” (Dakim, Inc, 2009, “Neuro-
plasticity”), contrasting pathology and (guided) plasticity cannot
satisfactorily delineate normal from abnormal aging. If training
enterprises are to make dementia-based anxieties a foundational
part of their message and product claims, large bodies of research
examining the subtleties of brain-based decline in old age may be
glossed-over, not to mention the complex interaction of disease
processes with environmental, social and cultural factors. This
makes CT’s version of the aging brain a very limited and limiting
frame for viewing the complexities of the aging process.
The promise of a non-invasive, accessible way to prevent
dementia has obvious appeal, and perhaps that reason alone
has driven the bulk of CT’s success. However, this presents a
challenging version of biocapital, where the value of a prod-
uct is deeply entangled with hope and expectation surrounding
its claims to future success. Study of exactly this phenomenon
has grown in recent years to a diverse field studying scientific
futures or the “sociology of expectations”, where the promises and
predictions surrounding a technology drive change at both an
economic and social level (cf. Novas, 2006; Pollock and Williams,
2010; Tutton, 2011). In the example of scientific futures in anti-
aging technologies, it has previously been noted that fears about
growing older are employed to propel research and legitimation
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in a disputed field (Mykytyn, 2006). To put it more bluntly,
new technologies may employ what Joe Dumit has termed a
“venture science”, where expectations are employed to simulta-
neously create new biomedical knowledge and economic growth
(Dumit, unpublished paper). In the case of CT, plasticity is
promised as an antidote for aging, and a way to “regain the brain
power they enjoyed 10 years before” (Brain Center International,
2014, “Neuroplasticity”). However, these promises reach beyond
a simple prophylactic framework, and encompass wider area of
concern and critical analysis surrounding discourses found in
their perspective on the normally aging individual and brain.
SITUATING PLASTICITY IN A SOCIAL WORLD:
SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN SHAPING BRAIN
HEALTH
Just as the development of MCI as a framework for understanding
cognitive changes has attracted attention criticism from scholars
in the natural and social sciences (cf. Graham and Ritchie, 2006;
Hyman, 2006; Graham, 2008), the framing of the “normally”
aging brain as a homogenous zone of neurotechnology-backed
intervention may become a problematic way to understand and
interact with that category. The relationship between concepts of
aging and the biosciences has never been truly straightforward,
but in North America and Europe, individuals’ lives in the “third
age” after retirement have in the past century increasingly become
influenced by ideas stemming from advances in science and
medicine (Kaufman, 1994; Katz, 1996; Powell, 2006). In 1989,
Estes and Binney (1989) coined the phrase “biomedicalization
of aging” to describe what they termed “the social construction
[. . .] and praxis of aging as a medical problem”. This process,
they write, is thought to create a unimodal understanding and
method for dealing with of the aging process, excluding social
or cultural interpretations or forms of interaction. The biomed-
ical tradition already maintains a powerful influence on most
pathological processes in old age such as preventative lifestyle
practices or views about death and dying, but growing interest
in anti-aging technologies has promoted a view of the typically
aging body according to a medical gaze and focus on pathology
(Rose, 2001; Kaufman et al., 2004; Mykytyn, 2006; Powell, 2006).
More recently, several authors have posited that these trends are
employing widening interest in neuroscience to draw nearer to the
mind and brain (Rose, 2007; Katz and Peters, 2008; Millington,
2011; Williams et al., 2012).
Evidently, therefore, biomedical control is neither a new phe-
nomenon nor area of study. Neither is the idea that under the aus-
pices of medical-scientific knowledge, new categories of social life
may be created and altered. Since Paul Rabinow’s seminal work
on “biosociality”, or the formation of new networks united by
biological qualities (Rabinow, 1996), many anthropologists and
sociologists have explored shifts to these new forms of identity
and interaction. From ethnographic field work with carriers of
susceptibility genes (cf. Gibbon, 2007; Lock, 2013) to new concep-
tions of biovalue caught up with patient networks and activism
(cf. Novas, 2006), it has been acknowledged that science and
medicine can cause profound shifts in social life and organiza-
tion. This is especially evident in neuroscience-related disciplines,
where biological explanations of the brain and mind appear to
deeply influence social environments and ideas about personhood
and human nature. In the case of mental illness, authors such as
Joe Dumit and Emily Martin have written extensively on both
the problematic and liberating views held by individuals within
these neuro-centric networks (Dumit, 2004; Martin, 2009). Neu-
rological selfhood has also been explored in relation to new
technologies, most notably, the rise of neuro-pharmaceuticals and
their consequences for defining moral obligations and identity
(Rose, 2007; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). While CT can draw
heavily from these previous descriptions, particularly with respect
to the role of technology in shaping lifestyle, it differs in several
key aspects. First, CT seeks to situate itself in a historically (and
contemporarily) liminal category, where boundaries of pathology
are unclear. This means that there is a strong impetus to define
a target population, and create a prescriptive frame for action.
While other forms of medical intervention have formed com-
munities based on “embodied risk”, or future susceptibility to a
condition (Kavanagh and Broom, 1998; Lock and Nguyen, 2010),
CT seeks to do the opposite, by creating a framework based on
normality. The key to this angle is plasticity, which unites prospec-
tive consumers by the possession of an untapped resource that can
strengthen their degree of normality. Thus, an inherent quality of
the human brain is monopolized to create a fresh, homogenous
take on how to age well, and promise distancing from the threat of
abnormal pathology. As we will see below, although this message
has many liberating characteristics, it ultimately carries a weighty
moral comment that will be explored below.
Additionally, it is still important to remember that CT pro-
grams for older adults differ from many previously-studied agents
in the creation of new networks in that it cannot be formally
prescribed as a medical intervention. Therefore, its liminal phase
outside of formal interventions represents both a challenge for
study, and a boon to the companies themselves. Several compa-
nies use this to their advantage, stressing a “Non-invasive [. . .]
drug free” approach (Posit Science, 2013, “How brain training
works”), differentiating themselves from non-organic methods
which “artificially and temporarily [alter] the way your brain
works” (Pearson, 2013, “Cogmed is based on a research break-
through”). With or without official sanction from biomedical
authorities, their technologies appear to have been embraced
by consumers, pharmaceutical and health insurance companies
and become linked with a growing social impetus to intervene
in and potentially control aging. As much as this drive may be
considered a scientific endeavor to learn and repair the aging
brain, it is entangled with ideas about aging that stem from social
spheres. These, no less than biochemical justifications validate
and strengthen CT companies’ vision of the again brain, and
become enmeshed with neuroscientific explanations of human
aging as concrete, “treatable” facts. In this light, it is fundamental
to understand and perhaps challenge which social versions of
aging are appropriated in CT literature, and just how they interact
to form a vision of aging so palatable to industry and the public.
A brief glance at most neuroscience-based product literature
demonstrates an interesting mix of ideas from both biomedically-
and socially-informed spheres of aging. To review, neurochemical
aging is employed by almost all groups through messages about
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employing training with a view to prevent dementia and other
pathological processes. According to this approach, “normalcy”
is concrete, all-inclusive, and delineated by scientific knowledge.
It is a space where, sooner or later, most aging adults will find
themselves prior to descent into illness, and where they could
stand to benefit from training approaches. “Staving off and/or
slowing down dementia”, explains one product website, “. . .is
therefore the obvious reason for seniors to engage in a dedicated
brain fitness program” (Dakim, Inc, 2013, “The science behind
Dakim Brain Fitness”). Employing plasticity is the key to this
approach, and will allow the user to slow down the processes of
aging, and potentially prevent pathology. Thus, aging is a unitary,
degenerative process which may only be altered by appropriate,
technology-backed intervention and training. However, this sin-
gular and rather dark vision is in stark contrast with more positive
interpretations strongly reminiscent of literature from seniors’
rights groups, biogerontologists, and others decrying the image
of older adults as a homogenous, impaired group (Coupland and
Coupland, 1993; Blaikie, 1999). For example, one company speaks
of “successful aging” (Brain Center International, 2013, “Science’s
way to brain health”), while another emphasizes the brain’s ability
to “grow and change at any point in the lifetime” (Lumosity,
2013, “Your brain is amazing”). In other cases, using training to
engage plasticity creates “successful agers” who are “optimistic,
resilient in the face of life’s changes, and have a well developed
sense of control. And they’re constantly stimulating their cog-
nitive faculties” (Brain Center International, 2014, “Successful
Brain Aging”). This, finally, is where CT’s heritage of experience-
dependent plasticity comes into full play, in demonstrating the
brain’s marvelous capacity to be shaped by the conscientious user.
While this approach presents a flexible and self-defined view of
aging, it is no less important to explore in the light of its framing
of plasticity and normalcy. Strategies based on self-investment
through improvement of health have increasingly become an area
of investigation and critique in the past decades, and succinctly
categorized by Michel Foucault as “technologies of the self ”.
This process, he writes, “permits individuals by their own means
or with the help of others a certain number of operations on
their own bodies [. . .] so as to transform themselves in order to
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or
immortality” (Foucault, 1988). Already well-noted in the litera-
ture surrounding “lifestyle” or “active living” interventions aimed
at the (aging) body (Katz, 2000, 2006; Millington, 2011), this type
of will to health is somewhat newer to the mind and brain (Rose,
2005; Friedman et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2012). Experience-
dependent plasticity may assume this role as a “pragmatic, holis-
tic, and effective” avenue for change in the brain in CT literature
(Pearson, 2013, “Cogmed is based on a research breakthrough”),
even if knowledge about age-related pathology appears to still
underlie the fundamental impetus to use these training programs.
The aging brain, therefore, is framed as a new theatre of action,
in which only plasticity-based interventions, when “thoughtfully
and methodically explored” via training motivated and targeted
scientific interventions will perform the maintenance and repair
necessary to “remember more, think faster, and achieve your full
potential” (Lumosity, 2013, emphasis in original, “Your brain is
amazing”) without the worry of disease.
In the view of scientists, clinicians and policy-makers, this
level of interest in (and seriousness accorded to) cognitive health
is a fundamental factor in maintaining a healthy aging popula-
tion (cf. Depp et al., 2012; World Health Organization, 2012).
Indeed, should the most optimistic promises of CT turn out
to be true, then caring for cognitive health in this way would
have major beneficial effects. Yet, the ways in which this message
about the promise of changeability is framed and promoted in
the development of CT still needs to be appraised carefully,
with particular attention to the ways in which neuroscience is
used to define, delimit and remedy the complex collection of
processes through which the process of aging manifests itself.
In this case, experience-dependent plasticity is used to promote
a highly individualized relationship between an older individual
and their brain, where only motivation and body work on the
part of the former can save the latter. And the stakes are high.
Several companies equate age-related cognitive decline to losing
your “Life Story”, (Vivity Labs, 2013, “Fit Brains FAQ”), or a
brain that is “ever present, ever listening, ever learning, obeying
our every command, solving our every problem, attending to our
emotions and wishes, remembering our joys and sorrows, [. . .]
our best friend” (Cognifit, 2013, “Train your brain seriously”).
Could this be what Rose and Novas (2003) have described as a
“moral economy of hope”, where the promises of new technology
both augment its biocapital and engender responsibility on the
part of the user?
The predictive power of these claims aside, this level of entan-
glement between health and identity in anti-aging technology has
been identified by numerous authors and activists as creating a
problematic “will to health”. This situation places an individual
in a narrow relationship with their body and promotes a moral
and ethical imperative to healthful action. Further, it may subse-
quently neglect important cultural and social factors and inequal-
ities that shape the user’s lifeworld (Estes and Binney, 1989;
Vincent, 2006; Higgs et al., 2009). This is especially important
for a body of work relying on experience-dependant plasticity,
about which more and more is learned every day about how
neurological malleability is acted-on by a variety of extrinsic
forces. Since findings from early epidemiological data from the
1920s, it has largely been accepted that several social factors
are an important driving force for the health of adults in later
life, including social support, socioeconomic status and mobility
(Smith and Kington, 1997; Ó Luanaigh and Lawlor, 2008), and
several of these factors have also been associated with structural
diversity in the adult and aging brain (Fotenos et al., 2008;
Krishnadas et al., 2013). Even an individual’s subjective beliefs
about aging and cognition have been shown to be a major factor in
cognitive performance (Seeman et al., 1996; Hertzog and Hultsch,
2000; Cook and Masrirske, 2006). In this way, CT is potentially
placed in a position to both mold and “repair” an individual’s self-
concept, creating and shaping identities linked to understandings
of their brain and mind (Ortega and Vidal, 2007; Vidal, 2009).
Each of these potentially plasticity-inducing factors exists within a
complex web of interaction, and as such, may not be seen as purely
or unidirectionally causative (Kramer et al., 2004; Hackman et al.,
2010 ). Yet, via mechanisms that are not fully understood, they
appear to engage with the malleable brain in ways that shape
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cognitive health in later life and that may or may not ultimately be
changed by training. The biocapital of CT, therefore, appears to
hinge on a type of scientific future where experience-dependent
plasticity is a singular commodity rather than all-encompassing
feature of lived experience.
MOVING FORWARDWITH COGNITIVE TRAINING
Taken together, ideas surrounding the potential for operational-
izing plasticity in the “normally” aging brain form a complex
dialogue, drawing from a variety of sources to promote individual
responsibility in exercising the mind and staving off cogni-
tive decline. While the possibility of intervention is a powerful
message, it constructs the aging mind as a zone of tension
between discourses on the nature of aging, personalized pos-
sibility of intervention, and a brain only selectively permeable
to experience-dependent plasticity. The largely positive messages
of CT literature trumpet the advances of contemporary sci-
entific understanding of aging, and promise tangible improve-
ments and long-term effects of exercising the mind as a muscle.
While such intervention in normal aging is still a fairly young
concept in both scientific and public spheres, it is a power-
ful one, opening new possibilities for dealing with cognitive
decline and redefining the aging mind positively as a flexible
entity. It is not yet known whether this vision of the aging
mind and brain will be ultimately liberating or constraining,
or how training will evolve to fit an increasingly sophisticated
understanding of the constant negotiation of social, cultural,
and environmental factors shaping cognitive function in later
years. At present, CT paradigms that target the aging brain
represent an immense opportunity, not only in terms of scien-
tific progress, but also in capturing public consciousness about
cutting-edge neuroscience and placing it in a very real, very
immediate context, which sooner or later, most individuals will
experience. Therefore, now more than ever, it is crucial to move
forward with integrative research to understand the dimensions
and limitations of this new paradigm for understanding the aging
mind.
Moving forward in research and treatment with CT absolutely
and necessarily requires ongoing verification and challenge to
existing training paradigms and constant monitoring to assure
that viable strategies, adequate control groups and unbiased
research are actively promoted (Elias and Wagster, 2007; Rabipour
and Raz, 2012; Thomas and Baker, 2012). In addition, there is
great opportunity to engage in thoughtful, holistic research to
better understand how the concept of a malleable brain gains
from, and contributes to ongoing discourse in both the social
and natural sciences. If the brain is truly as plastic and embedded
in its sociocultural context as we believe, then it represents the
perfect milieu for interdisciplinary research on aging. At one
end of the spectrum, more basic neurobiological work must be
done to more fully understand the basic processes involved in
producing different ranges of function at different time-points
in the lifecourse, and understand that the way which plasticity
is mobilized to promote adaptation to ongoing needs of the
organism may too be different. However, this research must
recognize that due to the experience-dependent nature of the
brain, aging can necessarily not be the same for all individuals,
and therefore cannot be reduced by bookending with pathology.
In this sense, the roles of biogerontology, medical sociology, and
transcultural psychiatry are paramount, to explore the ways in
which an individual’s environment selects for, protects against, or
interacts with ongoing biological processes to produce cognitive
change in later years. Perhaps more importantly, these disciplines,
coupled with approaches from anthropological and philosophical
traditions, can explore the ways in which understandings of aging
impact an individual’s self-concept, and beliefs about lifecourse
transformations and their effects on the brain and mind.
If CT can be used to create a space for research examining
plasticity and embeddedness by looking inward to underlying
processes, then it should equally be used in looking outward to a
new vision of aging and change on individual, cultural, and social
spheres. Using Hacking’s concept of “bio-looping”, through which
cultural contexts of science interact with biomedical knowledge
and actors in a reflexive process (Hacking, 1995, 2007; Choudhury
et al., 2009), this new field of neuroscientific knowledge may be
productively explored in respect to wider social processes. Though
still new technology, it is important to examine which elements of
this malleable aging brain get carried through to policy formation,
or ways of promoting public health within the community. At the
level of research and knowledge transfer, it will further be interest-
ing to monitor how the successes and failures of CT are adopted
or rejected by other forms of emerging neurotechnology. As a
training approach that still straddles uneven territory between
experimental work and wide-scale preventative medicine, many
groups have an investment in CT, and the renegotiation of
its status through positive messages from popular media and
advertising will create interesting dynamics between stakeholders,
scientists and the lay public. Will the idea of a brain that changes
itself in late life have the power to alter these individuals’ self-
concepts, of affect the process of identity formation? These, and
many other questions could represent fruitful avenues for future
research.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As it stands this type of work is in its infancy, and the present
paper cannot be said to explore all dimensions of the true ongoing
dynamics of plasticity, CT, and new dimensions of aging. While
using public information communicated by CT companies is
an important first step, particularly with respect what poten-
tial consumers are likely to encounter in descriptions of late-
life plasticity, this approach presents several limitations. In the
future, we hope to expand our investigations to include first-hand
research with participants involved in CT, the companies that
produce them, and the various agencies that help communicate
CT’s promises and complexities to the public. Thus, it is our hope
to better expand on the goals and motivations of these players,
and understand how they interact to create new knowledge about
the brain. Time will reveal the qualities of adult neuroplasticity
upheld by CT have the power to create new understandings of
aging, and more research will undoubtedly add nuance to the
story that this paper could not.
In conclusion, new understandings of neuroplasticity have
helped shape a scientific and cultural space for change and
reorganization in the aging brain, opening diverse possibilities
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for exploring treatment and enrichment. Molded through the
influence of CT initiatives, it presents a framework where influ-
ences from biomedical and cultural spheres shape a vision of
hope and challenge in understanding the aging brain as a zone
for change and improvement, new discoveries in neuroscience
can be mobilized to promote a vision of an active, healthy
mind and brain. Though this framing of an individual as a
biological and social entity bears room for analysis and criti-
cal thought, especially as CT enterprises further diversify and
grow, it is one which represents an amazing space for inte-
grative research in how the aging brain is shaped by a variety
of entities, and ultimately, represents one of the most intellec-
tually challenging spaces for contemporary natural and social
sciences.
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